The aim of electronic voting schemes is to provide a set of protocols that allow voters to cast ballots while a group of authorities collect the votes and output the final tally. In this paper we describe a practical multi-candidate election scheme that guarantees privacy of voters, public verifiability, and robustness against a coalition of malicious authorities. Furthermore, we address the problem of receipt-freeness and incoercibility of voters. Our new scheme is based on the Pailller cryptosystem and on some related zero-knowledge proof techniques. The voting schemes are very practical and can be efficiently implemented in a read system.
INTRODUCTION

Motivation
An electronic voting scheme is a set of protocols which allow voters to cast ballots while a group of authorities collect the votes and output the final tally. We present a practical multi-candidate election system that is scalable, reliable, and can tolerate any number of participants and candidates.
In most of the previous work, the ~yes/no" paradigm in which voters can only cast a boolean vote has been used for technical reasons. But this model is not practical since usually one should consider at least the null vote in addition. Moreov~, in a practical system, the tally should be computed at different levels in order to give local, regional and national results. Consequently, the election scheme we propose is practically oriented for large groups of voters and multiple candidates with the possibility of partial tally computation. Moreover, previous works have not described the whole election system from the booth to the computation of the tally in int~r~aediary levels such as local, regional and
In Benaloh schemes, a voter shares his vote between n authorities so that (t + l)-out-of-them can recover it. Next, each authority computes its encrypted share of the tally and finally at least t+l authorities should collaborate to actually compute the tally.
Cramer et al. [10] use another model in which all voters send their encrypted votes to a single combiner. Using the homomorphic property of the cryptosystem, this entity computes the encrypted tally in a publicly verifiable way. Then, the combiner forwards it to the authorities and (t+l)-out-of-them should recover the tally by running ~ threshold cryptosystem. This model is optimal for the communications between voters and authorities. Hence, as we use it, we need a threshold cryptosystem.
In this paper, we address election schemes where multiple candidates can be managed. Multi-candidate election schemes have been first investigated by Cramer et aL in [9] and further studied in [i0] . In this last scheme, the computation of the tally grows exponentially with the number of candidates : ft((V~) p-I) where ~ is the number of voters and p the number of candidates.
The cryptosystem of Paillier [27] provides an efficient decryption algorithm as well as the largest bandwidth among all cryptosystems using a trapdoor to compute the discrete logarithm. Both of these arguments are the ma~n components to design multi-candidate election schemes and finally a threshold version of this crypt@system appeared in [15] and was rediscovered independently but later in [11] .
In this last paper, the authors have a new and original point of view on Paillier scheme and provide another thresh-old version. They apply this sharing scheme to a multicandidate voting scheme as we made but with a different cryptographic proof. The complexity of the proof is logarithmic in the number of candidates whereas the complexity of ours is linear. On the other hand, [11] uses complex zeroknowledge proofs of multiplication, and that can potentially make the complexities of the two schemes comparable for a small number of candidates.
Furthermore, their paper is quite different from our paper since we try to build a global system and not only cryptographic primitives. We have a vision of the whole security features of the voting system. Moreover, our solution takes into account anonymity and receipt-freeness properties.
Achievements
Our voting system is efficient and flexible to also take into account the different hierarchy levels. The new voting scheme guarantees the following requirements: privacy of voters, public verifiability, robustness and receipt-freeness.
The privacy of users ensures that a vote will be kept secret from any coalition of t authorities where t is a system parameter. The public verifiability ensures that any party including outside observers can convince herself that the election is fair and that the published tally is correctly computed from the ballots that were correctly cast. Next, the robustness of the scheme ensures that the system can tolerate faulty authorities who try to cheat during the computation of the tally. Finally, the receipt-freeness property ensures that the voter cannot construct a receipt proving the content of his vote in order to avoid coercibility and "vote buying".
Outline of the paper
In section 2, we present the organization of the election system. Then, we recall the basic cryptographic tools as Paillier cryptosystem, a threshold decryption algorithm for this scheme, and some zero-knowledge proofs related to a variant of the discrete logarithm problem. In section 4, our complete voting scheme and system is described. Finally, we discuss some related issues such as the practical complexity of the scheme, the anonymity of users and a receipt-free version.
ELECTION ORGANIZATION
Architecture
In this section we present a large group-oriented system that can be used for nation-wide elections. In this case, some organizational constraints have to be carefully taken into account.
For example, the following system presents "direct" elections in a real life scenario :
1. The local center deals with certification of the users and veri~ that voters can vote only once. The local authorities also verify correctness of the votes. This task can also be checked by anybody else.
2. The local centers send local results to a regional center that collects all local tallies, verifies that local centers sent correct information and computes the regional resuits.
3. All regional centers send regional results to the national center which computes the final result and checks whether regional centers have correctly performed their tasks.
Candidates
In the simplest case, the election aims at choosing one winner out of several candidates. The candidates are potentially physical people, ~es/no" decision, or any arbitrary set of propositions among which a choice has to be made. They are further designated by the numbers {1, 2,... ,p}. They may include a ~null" element.
2J Players
The architecture involves several entities at different leveis.
Voter A voter is a registered person who is allowed to express one vote for one candidate. Each ballot has the same weight in the final result.
Local authority In a local area, ballots are collected by a local authority whose goal is to compute the local result and forward it at a regional level.
Regional authority A regional authority receives local results and computes the regional result which is forwarded to the national authority. National authority At the top level, the national authority collects regional results, and publishes for each candidate the total number of vote.
Trusted Time Stamp This player guarantees that a player has voted before a certain time.
Communication Model
The communication model we use is a public broadcast c~annel with memory and can be implemented with a bulletin board [I] . All communication with the bulletin board are public and can be universally monitored. No party can erase any information but each voter can enter his part of the board.
To control the connection between voters and the bulletin board, an access control must be used.
Other Attacks in Voting System
Our voting system takes into account two different attacks that appear when we want to build a complete system.
Intermediary Authorities Attack This attack involves
intermediary authorities who try to falsify the final result of the national authority.
Rushing Attack At the closure time of the voting system, the local authorities reveal their local tally. The system can be protected to withstand a rushing attack of users who try to falsify the tally if they wait the result of the local authority to vote.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS
Paillier Cryptosystem
Various cryptosystems based on randomized encryption schemes E(M) which encrypt a message M by raising a basis g to the power M and suitably randomizing this result have been proposed so far [17, i, 22, 26, 27] . Their security is based on the intractability of various "residuosity ~ problems. As an important consequence of this encryption technique, those schemes have homomorphic properties.
Homomorphic Properties
They can be informally stated as follows:
These =algebraic properties" enable to compute with encrypted values without knowing the content of ciphertexts. They are useful when the anonymity of users is required. For example, we can compute the tally without deerypting each vote and therefore can guarantee the privacy of users.
In electronic voting schemes, a variant of the EIG~m~! encryption scheme [10] has been widely use& Instead of encrypting m with (gk mod p, my k mod p), we compute (gk mod p,g,nyk modp). Unfortunately, such a scheme cannot be considered as a trapdoor discrete logarithm scheme because no trapdoor exists to determine m given gm rood p. Anyway, in U0/l" voting schemes, the cryptosystem only manages small numbers because the number of voters is limited and each voter votes a0" or "1=. Consequently, the tally cannot be very large and an exhaustive search allows to give the result.
However, in multi-candidate election schemes the tally can become larger because the encoding of many candidates cannot be reduced and if we want to continue to compute the different results, we have to use an encoding size in O(px [~t) , where p is the number of candidates and [£[ is the size of the number of users. For example, a national election may involve 10 candidates and hundred millions voters needs the ability to encrypt 266-bits messages. In such applications, the modified EIG~m~J scheme can no longer be used since exhaustive search, or more efficient methods like index calculus algorithm, c~nnot efficiently recover the tally. A solution is to use a trapdoor discrete logarithm scheme with large bandwidth such as Naccache-Stern [22] , Okamoto-Uchiyama [26] , or Paillier [27] .
Description of PaiUier scheme
Paillier has presented three closely related such cryptosysterns in [27] . We only recall the first one.
• Key Generation. Let N be an RSA modulus N ----pq, where p and q are prime integers. Let g be an integer of order a multiple of N modulo N 2. The public key is PK = (N, g) and the secret key is SK = ~(N)
where ~(N) is defined as ~(N) = lcm ((p-1)(q -1)).
• Encryption. To encrypt a message M E ZN, randomly choose z in Z~v and compute the ciphertext c = g~z N rood N 2.
• Decryptlon. To decrypt c, 
3~ Threshold Version of Paillier Cryptosys~rn
In order to prevent authorities to learn the votes and to protect the privacy of users, we can use a threshold version of Paillier cryptosystem. Therefore, instead of merely decrypt the encrypted tally, e_~ch authority uses n servers to share its secret key so that at least t authorities are required to decrypt a vote.
Threshold decryption model
The deeryption process includes the following players : a combiner, a set of n servers P~, and users. We consider the following scenario :
• In an initialization phase, the servers use a distributed key generation algorithm to c~eate the public key PK and seeret shares SI~ of the private key SK. To remove the trusted dealer, see [12, 14] . Next the servers publish verification keys VK, VK~.
• To encrypt a message, any user can run the encryption algorithm using the public key PK.
• To decrypt a cipbertext c, the combiner forwards c to the servers. Using their secret keys SK~ and their verification keys VK, VKi, each server runs the deeryption algorithm and outputs a partial decryption c~ with a proof of validity of the partial decryption proof,. Finally, the combiner uses the combining algorithm to recover the cleartext if enough partial decryptions are valid.
This scheme is presented in appendix 10.2.
3~ Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Given encryptions of Paillier, we review various zero-knowledge proofs that the secret message satisfies some properties. We simply state what can be guaranteed by atBxing the proof of the encryption. Details are provided in appendix 10.3.
Proof of knowledge of an encrypted message.
When creating the encryption of a message it is possible to prove that one actually knows the encrypted m e~gN e.
Let N be a k-bit P~A modulus. Given c = g'~r mod N 2, the prover P convinces the verifier V that he knows m similar to Ok-~moto [25] and Guillou-Quisquater [18] .
We note a .'-b the quotient in the division of a by b. 
Proof that an encrypted message lies in a given set of messages.
When encryptiug a message, it is possible to append a proof that the message lies in a public set S = {ml,... , ~} of p messages without revealing any further information.
Proof of equality of plaintexts.
When encrypting a message, it is possible to append a proof that two encrypted message are equal.
THE VOTING SCHEME
In this section, we describe the complete protocol of our scheme, using the cryptographic tools presented in section 3. Especially, we wish to emphasis the user's vote generation and the communication between the three hierarchical levels, the national one, the regional one, and the local one.
Setup
We consider a l-out-of-p election where one candidate is chosen among p others. In the initialization process, each authority, at any level generates its public key and certifies it with an independent certification authority. We use the following hierarchical notation: pk for the national authority, pki for the regional authorities and pkij for the local authorities.
Aider the preliminary phase, each authority publishes on its own bulletin board the correct public keys: for eyample, the i th regional authority the keys pk,pki, and the jth local authority of the i th regional authority the keys pk,pk~,pk~z.
We denote by t the number of voters and we set M an integer larger than t. For e~ample, we can choose M = 2 [l°g2t] , the pow~ of 2 immediately larger than t.
The Voting Phase
Consider a voter from a local area with public keys pk, p~, p~,j who wishes to vote for the mth candidate. He issues a ballot in the following way: 2. Using each public key, he encrypts the integer with Palllier scheme and generates the ciphertexts C~, C~ and Ct encrypted respectively with the national, regional and local public key.
3. He generates three proofs to convince any verifier that each ciphertext encrypts a valid vote, i.e. an integer M m with m E {1,... ,p}. This is done using the proof that a message lies in a given set.
4. He generates one proof to convince any verifier that the three ciphertexts encrypt the same vote. This is done using proofs of equality of plalntexts. Notice that such a proof is sound because the previous ones guarantees that the size of the encrypted message is bounded.
4~ Computation of the result
In this subsection we present the computation of the tally. First, we describe the bulletin board of the local authorities which can be accessed by all users for e~mple through the web site of the local authority A~j. Figure 2 shows such a bulletin board where the k th us~ can read and write in his own row but can only read the other rows.
The voters write their n~me together with their certificates, the three votes and the proofs. Next, they sign all the data in the previous columns of their row and the vote is signed by a time stamp server.
When the Voting system is closed, the local authorities have to verify all the proofs and signatures of users and of the time stamp serve. Then, the local authorities A~j compute the product of the correct votes in columns 2 to 4. Next, they act as the combiner in the threshold dscryption Paillier cryptosystem for the first product which corresponds to their public key. The decryption can be monitored by outsiders since the decryption process is publicly verifiable.
The local tallies are published in the bulletin board of the regional authorities .4/in column 1 and in column 2 and 3 they write the product of the elements in their own bulletin board. The different authorities Aij which depend on the authority A~ have the same rights as users in the previous bulletin boar~ The column Ct is replaced by the decrypted tally. The regional authorities Ai compute the sum in the first column, the products of column 2 and 3, and decrypt the final product in column 2 with the threshold process as the local authorities. At the end, they verify that the tallies computed by the two methods matches. They write on the bulletin board of the national authority their sum in column 1. In column 2, they write the product of their local authorities. The national authority can compute the product of the elements in colnm-2 of its bulletin board. Then, it decrypts this product and verifies whether this result is equal to the sum of the elements in column 1.
Frauds in the computation
The hierarchical subdivisions provide an efficient way of distributing public verifications of the results. Each voter is enable to check whether his vote has been taken into account in the local tally. Then, he recursively performs similar verifications which convinced him that the next level domain correctly included the local tally. Finally, he is guaranteed that his vote is part of the national result. Assuming that the number of hierarchical divisions is d (3 in our discussion) and the total number of voters is t then the computation
load is O(d z/t ) which is easily performed on a single PC.
Additionally, if any error is detected by a given authority the faulty sub-results may be discarded from the tally until further recomputation.
ENHANCEMENTS OF THE SCHEME
Time Stamp server
The voting system closes at a precise time T. Hence, the votes of users who have not voted before T will not be taken into account for the computation of the tally. Therefore, the users who have correctly voted before T and whose votes have been refused because of time reasons, must prove that their vote is valid. Consequently, a time stamping system is used to ensure that votes have been performed before T.
Anonymity
In actual paper-based vote processes, the list of active voters is known, at least by the authority. But it is basically due to the need to control that nobody votes twice.
However, there is no practical reason for having such a list of the active participants and in most situation only the total number of them is required. Moreover, because of the digital format, some large scale analysis can be performed, over many voting processes.
As a consequence, it may be essential to protect anonymity of (non)-voters, while being able to avoid double-voting. As usual, blind signatures [6] are a convenient tool for providing such an anonymity, while preventing double-usage of a certificate.
Let us consider a blind signature scheme that prevents "one-more forgeries" [29] . One can either use the Ok~moto-Schnorr [25, 32] version which is based on the ditficulty of computing discrete logarithms, or the O]~moto-GuillouQuisquater [25, 18] version which is based on the ditBculty of computing e-th roots modulo a composite number. One may remark that the latter does not add any computational assumption since the KSA problem is stronger than the Higher-Residue problem.
After having proven his identity, each user creates a new pair of matching secret and public keys. Then, with the help of the authority(ies), he gets a certificate on it, using a blind signature process. Of course, the authority have to accept to interact at most once with a user. ThereaSter, each voter possesses just one certified public key, which may be used as a pseudonym.
Since we also want to prevent the collusion between a user and the authorities, we have to use a distributed blind signature which requires all the authorities together to help the user to get a valid pseudonym. Therefore, if some authorities would like to help a user to get many pseudonyms to sign more than once, it would be impossible.
An e~ample of such a distributed certification of pseudonyms is given in appendix 10.4.
Receipt-Free and Incoercible Properties
The concept of areceipt-freeness~ was first presented by Benaloh and Tuinstra [2] . Their solution uses a voting booth that physically guarantees two-way secret communication between the authorities and each voter. Next, another receiptfree voting protocol based on a mix-net channel has been proposed by Sako and Kilian [31] where only a one-way secret communication from the authorities to the voters is assumed.
Another class of solutions uses deniable encryption [4, 5] such that the voters can lie later how the ciphertext is encrypted and this technique ensures incoercible voters.
We first define both notions of receipt-freeness and incoercibility. Then, we describe our proposal based on the existence of a secret communication channel between each user and an independant party, called randomizer.
Definitions
Receipt-Freeness ensures that the voter cannot provide any receipt proving the content of his vote, even if he wants to.
Incoercibillty ensures that a voter cannot be coerced to release his vote.
While the receipt-free property is aimed to prevent users to sell their votes, the incoercible property prevents a coercer to force the voter to reveal his vote. We only focus on receipt-freeness in this article because it is a stronger requirement if we assume that there is no communication between the coercer and the voter during the protocol.
Physical Assumptions
To provide receipt-freeness we can use a physical assumption like a tamper-resistant device (such as smartcards) so that the random data used during the voting phase cannot be read by anybody. Therefore, thanks to the semantic security of Paillier's cryptosystem we are sure that anybody c~nnot learn anything about the vote, even with the help of the voter. However, this assumption may be too strong in some cases, then we will alternatively assume a secret communication cbannel between any user and a randomizer.
Previous Work
The assumption of secret communication channel has also been used in the recent paper of Hirt and Sako [19] . But the communication load of their mix-net to provide receiptfreeness if very high.
Indeed, in their technique, they assume, as we do, that the encryption scheme £ is homomorphic but also allows random re-encryption, which we denote by =~-".
• • each authority przmutes and re-encrypts all the votes, with a random permutation, but also new random values so that the voter cannot prove the content of an encryption = {z~,l :--tr~_l,,,,(,),t:~,2 ~-tr~_l,,,,c2),...,
• each authority privately communicates the permutation ~ri to the us~, so that the user can follow the vote he wants to cast
• each authority privately proves that this permutation has really been used, in a zero-knowledge way (without revealing the new random): for each j, ~,j and £~-1,~/(j) encrypt the same message
• each authority publicly proves in zero-knowledge that there exists such a permutation: for each j, £i-lj has been re-encrypted in/~
• fin~ly, the user who is the only one able to follow his vote, points it in the final list.
The main drawback is that, on the public bulletin board, the public proofs must appear. In that technique, each authority proves that each message has been re-encrypted in the new list, which makes a very huge amount of data to store.
Independent Randomizers
Our proposal is in the same vein as the "self-scrambling anonymizers" [28] . Users ask an external entity to randomize their votes, without modifying the contents. But the voter requires more than just a new encryption of his vote: he wants a proof that this new ciphertext encrypts the same vote as his original one. However, that proof must not be transferable, otherwise it would provide a receipt, since he can prove the content of the original encryption. But this proof must also be zeroknowledge in order to leak no information about the new random value used in the encrypted vote. Therefore, either they use an interactive zero-knowledge proof, which is non-transferable, as any zero-knowledge proof, thanks to the simulatability of the transcript. Or they use a non-interactive designated-verifier proof [21] .
he needs a proof that the new encrypted vote is valid. However, without the additional random value introduced by the randomizer, he can no longer provide such a proof by himself. Therefore, he has to interact with the randomizer to get it. However, we want that any part of the transept of this interaction cannot be used as a receipt by a user. Thus we will use the divertible property [23, 3, 20, 7, 8] of the previous interactive proof that an encrypted message lies in a given set. With such a divertible proof, the transcript seen by the user is independent of the resulting proof: the resulting proof (signature) does not contain any subliminal channel that would enable the user to hide/choose something to make a receipt.
since three levels (and possibly more) are involved in our mechanism, the randomizer has to randomize the three votes, and the user needs a proof that the three resulting votes encrypt the same message. A divertible version of the proof of equality of plaintexts can also be used. See 10.5 for technical details.
PRACTICAL COMPLEXITY
Let us consider the practical complexity of the voting phase described is section 4. A vote consists of three ciphertexts C~, C~ and Cl and of some proofs of correctness. Some well known optimizations can be applied. For o~am-pie, the commitments can be replaced by their hash values as described in [16] For the complexity of the system, the use of several levels can be used the reduce the computational cost and memory cost. We can see that these costs are logarithmic in the number of levels.
CONCLUSION
279
In this paper we have described a practical multi-candidates election system which guarantees voting scheme requirements and is scalable so that any number of vote~ and candidates could be used. Moreover, the system can be adapted to real life scenario with different levels of authorities.
All cryptographic proofs have been optimized to provide an efficient voting scheme. 
Security of the cryptosystem
Let us denote HIt[N] the problem of deciding N th residuosity, i.e. distinguishing N th residues from non-N th residues. The high residuosity assumption is the generalization of the quadratic residuosity used in the Goldwuss~-Micaii cryptosystem [17] . In this last cryptosystem, given g a non- 10=?, Threshold Version of Psillier Cryptosystem
Description
This threshold version appeared in [15] along with a security analysis. We call A = n! where n is the number of servers among which the decryption key is distributed using a Sh~mir Secret Sharing scheme [34] . This threshold version is dosed to the Threshold RSA Signature described by Shoup in [35] . Although the following description uses safe prime RSA moduli (n =pq, where p and q are safe primes), we show in [14] how to make the robustness proof without such modulus and how to generate in a distributive manner the special RSA moduli that we need. The public key PK consists of g, N and the value $ = L(g "~) = am/~ rood N. Let VIE = v be a square that generates the cyclic group of squares in Z~v2. The verification keys VKi are obtained with the formula v ~a~ mod N 2.
Encryption algorithm To enerypta message M, randomly pick z E Z~v and compute c = g~z N rood N 2.
Share decryption algorithm The ith player P~ computes the deeryption share c~ = c 2A°~ rood N 2 using his secret share si. He makes a proof of correct decryption which assures that c 4A rood N 2 and v ~ rood N 2 have been raised to the same power si in order to obtain c~ and vi. This proof is a non-interactive statistically zero-knowledge proof of equality of discrete logarithms in a cyclic group of unknown order raN. The A factor is used in order to obtain integers and to avoid the computation of inverses modulo the secret value m. Therefore, the Lagrange interpolation formula implies :
Zero-knowledge Proofs
For convenience, we present only the interactive version of the protocols. Using the Fiat-Sk~m;r paradigm [13] , the verifier may be replaced by a hash function to form a noninteractive proof. In the random oracle model, security is guaranteed, provided the interactive scheme is zero-knowledge against a honest verifier [30, 24] . In the following, k is a security parameter. Later on we consider that all parameters are functions of k. In order to simplify the notations, we do not write the dependencies on k but when we say that an expression f is negligible, this means that f depends on k and that, for any polynomial P in k and for large enough k, f(k) < 1/p(k).
Proof of knowledge of an encrypted message.
Let N be a k-bit RSA modulus. Given c = g'nrN mod N 2, the prover P convinces the verifier V that he knovrs m similar to O]~moto and Guillou-Quisquater [25] . Completeness. Assume P knows m. Following the protocol it holds that gV ccwN = g~--em gmerNe sNr--eN gN((z--em)+N) = gz8N = U mod N 2, The term (x-era)+N in w corresponds to the quotient of the reduction modulo N in v. Therefore P is accepted with probability 1.
Soundness. Assume that a cheating prover P* is accepted with non-negligible probability. By a straightforward argument, P* passes the protocol for at least two different paths and their split can be computed in time linearly bounded by the inverse of P*'s advantage. It follows that using P* as an oracle, one may compute in polynomial time (el, Vl, wl) and (e2,v2,w2) such that gVlceaw N = U = g~ac*2w N modN 2 using an algorithm similar to [32] . Considering the partial logarithms (the discrete logarithm modulo N), it results that Vl + met = v2 + me2 mod N and so m = (v2 -Vl)/(el --e2) rood N which achieves the extraction of m from P*.
Simulation. Since we assumed a honest verifier, the challenge is independent from the commitment. 
Proof that an encrypted message lies in a given
set of messages. Let N be a k-bit RSA modulus, 8 = {mz,... , ran} a public set of p messages, and c = g"~ r N mod N 2 an encryption of mi where i is secret. In the protocol the prover P convinces the verifier V that c encrypts a message in S. 
THEOREM 2. For any non-zero parameters A and t such that 1/A t is negligible it holds that t iterations of the above protocol is a perfect zero-knowledge proof (against a honest verifier) that the decryption of c is a member of S.
PROOF.
Completeness. In the protocol, P has to commit to u~,..., uv as if he were proving in parallel that each c/gmJ is a N thresidue. To this end, he uses the malleability of the challenge that enables him to choose in advance p -1 values ej and computes the corresponding fake commitments uj ---- 
